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CHARITABLE TRUSTS IN TEXAS
A

DISrINGUISHING characteristic of a charitable trust is its
immunity from the operation of the constitutional prohibition against perpetual existence.' Before this exception to the ban
on perpetuities is applicable, the trust must be declared to have
been created for a charitable purpose. What is a charitable pur-

pose, and the related problems of benefits, administration, and
enforcement of charitable trusts in Texas, will be the subject matter of this comment. The cy pres doctrine' will be discussed as a
corollary to charitable purposes.
For a general classification of charitable purposes reference is
made to the Restatement of the Law of Trusts' where charitable
purposes are said to include the following:
"... the relief of poverty, the advancement of religion, the promotion of health, governmental or municipal purposes, and other purposes
the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the community."
The Supreme Court of Texas quotes the above excerpt in the
case of Boyd v. Frost National Bank' as the "current legal concepts of what are charitable purposes."' Another general test of
charitable purposes is stated as follows:
"When a trust will, in the opinion of a court, bring about a reasonable amount of advantage to society, according to the then existing
I Tx. CoNsr. Art. I, § 26. "Perpetuities ... are contrary to the genius of a free
government, and shall never be allowed,..."; Powers v. First Nat. Bank of Corsicana,
138 Tex. 604, 161 S. W. (2d) 273 (1942) ; Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex. 174 (1863).
2A general definition of this doctrine is found in 2 Boc.ERT. TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES,
§ 431 (1935). "It is the principle that equity will make specific a general charitable
intent of a settlor, and will, when an original specific intent becomes impossible or
impracticable of fulfillment, substitute another plan of administration which is believed to approach the original scheme as closely as possible."
9 1 RXSTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 368 (1935).
4 145 Tex. 206, 214. 196 S. W. (2d) 497, 502 (1946).
5 For another case adopting the same definition, see Moore v. Sellers. 201 S. W.
(2d) 249. 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) writ of error refused.
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standards in the community in question, the trust will be declared to be
charitable.""
The Supreme Court of Texas has been called upon to construe
instruments which were intended to create charitable trusts in several comparatively recent cases. The first of such cases was Allred
v. Beggs7 in which the testator directed that his executor sell property and distribute the proceeds, with the advice of testator's sister,
"to such charities and worthy objects as they.., shall determine. ' The Attorney General sought to enjoin the executor from
violating the terms of the will on the theory that the will created
a charitable trust subject to enforcement by the State. In affirming
the dissolution of an injunction granted by the trial court, the
Court said:
"When a fund or property is so given that it may or may not be used
for charity, or may or may not be used for a charitable object of a
public character, without violating the directions of the will, the case
is not one for enforcing the gift as a charity in a suit by the Attorney
General."9
This statement of the rule is in accord with the well established
general rule found in Morice v. The Bishop of Durham.1" If the
holding in the case had been based solely on the above premise,
then it would seem to have a sound basis since "worthy objects"

could be interpreted to mean inclusion of non-charitable purposes.
However, the Court went further and stated the following rule:
"If a testator leaves his estate to charity generally, but authorizes his
executor to determine for what charitable purposes it shall be used,
and the will contains no other definite manner of selection, the trust
is a personal one, and a court of equity does not have jurisdiction to
determine the purpose or select beneficiaries.""
6 BocrT, op. cit. supra note 2,§ 369 (1935).
7 125 Tex. 584, 84 S. W. (2d) 223 (1935). comment 14 TEL L. REv. 124 (1936).
8 Id. at 224.
'Id. at 228.
10 10 Ves. 521 (1805).
11 125 Tex. 584. 84 S. W. (2d) 223. 228 (1935).
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The fact situation of the case was such that the trust could have
been held invalid as allowing a private trust on the theory that the
trustee was free to devote the entire benefits to private purposes
or on the theory that the discretion of the trustee was not limited
to any particular charity but only by charity in general.
A subsequent case12 involving several purposes specified in a
will creating a charitable trust partially clarifies the holding in
Allred v. Beggs. The testarix directed that the trustee expend the
income from a trust fund "for worthy objects of charity, including
the support of the Christian religion as hereinafter indicated."'"
Among the enumerated recipients of the benefits were the indigent,
a specific Presbyterian church and orphanage, and- worthy boys
and girls who wanted to borrow from the fund for educational
purposes. Contestants of the will contended that under the principle set forth in Allred v. Beggs, the trustee was authorized to
select the beneficiaries of a general charity and that therefore the
trust failed. This contention was overruled by the court by striking
the comma from the above quoted clause and holding that a definite manner of selection by the trustee was outlined in the will.
By way of explanation the court admitted that the trustee would
have absolute discretion in selecting the worthy students and the
impoverished who were to receive benefits, but it was held that
classes of beneficaries were designated, and the only discretion
resting in the trustee was the power to select the individual beneficaries within these classes. At this point the court distinguished
between a public and private trust by stating that "an essential
element of a charitable trust is that the individual beneficiaries
be indefinite.' 4 After the court disposed of the issue of discretion
in the trustee. it held that "a gift for the relief of poverty generally
is a gift to a purely public charity because it relieves the whole
citizenship of its burden to the extent of the gift." 5 Further,
Powers v. First Nat. Bank of Corsicana, 138 Te. 604, 161 S. W. (2d) 273 (1942).
Id. at 277.
14 Id. at 283.
15Id. at 278. Accord: Bell County v. Alexander, 22 Tex. 350 (1858).
12
1I
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the fact that the application of the benefits was not confined
within any geographical limits did not alter the character of
the charitable gift. The gift to a specific Presbyterian church
was held to be charitable although only a small portion of the
community would derive benefits therefrom. The gift to the Presbyterian orphanage, which admitted orphans of all religious be.
liefs, was held a valid charity. It was indicated that the same
result would have been reached if the orphanage restricted its good
works to Presbyterian orphans. 6
A different proposition was presented in a more recent case"
where the testatrix left the residue of her property to a trustee to
be distributed to such charitable association or associations as the
trustee in his discretion might select. The trust was attacked on
the ground that the association or associations selected by the
trustee might expend the benefits for non-charitable purposes. This
contention was overruled for the reason that it is presumed that
gifts received from the trustees of a charitable trust will be used
exclusively by these associations for charitable purposes, and
there was dictum to the effect that the courts stood ready to check
any misappropriation of benefits.
A 1947 case 8 decided by the San Antonio Court of Civil
Appeals is indicative of the trend toward the crystalization of the
law of charitable trusts. Here the testatrix directed that the benefits
of the trust be used for Protestant orphanages, for playgrounds,
for equipment for YWCA and YMCA work, both local and national, for Red Cross Work, for general charity work through
organized and well established societies or associations, and for
scholarships. With a minimum of discussion, the court made a
sweeping decision that all of the named purposes could be classi16 For a case holding that a gift to the "Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Church for
the benefit and support of the poor helpless and dependent members and orphan children of said church...." was a charitable purpose, see Banner v. Rolf, 43 Tex. Civ.
App. 88. 94 S. W. 1125 (1906) writ of error refused.
17 Boyd v. Frost Nat. Bank. 145 Tex. 206, 196 S. W. (2d) 497 (1946).
18 Moore v. Sellers, 201 S. W. (2d) 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) writ of error refused.
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fled as charitable. Another notable point in this case was that the
Court rejected the view adopted by the majority in a Kansas Supreme Court decision 9 that a charitable purpose or object "is one
of such character that it might be established by government itself,
and be supported by taxation."20
Upon determining that a trust is for a charitable purpose and
therefore entitled to perpetual existence, the court becomes interested in its administration. Such trusts are commonly administered by trustees, but failure to name a trustee,21 incapacity of the
trustee named to take,2 2 or appointment of a trustee not in esse

such as a corporation to be,23 will not defeat the trust. In all of
these instances the court will interpose and appoint a trustee to
administer the trust.24 Where the testator or settlor has failed to
provide for successors to the original trustee, courts of equity will
appoint them. 25 Nor does the trust fail because of a refractory
trustee.2 6 Where the trustee selected by the settlor or testator is
given discretion in selecting charitable objects within a particular
class, the Texas Supreme Court has consistently upheld this power
of selection.2" However, it should be noted that such discretion is
subject to review by the court for the purpose of determining
19 Troutman v. De Boissier, 66 Kans. 1, 71 Pac. 286 (1903).
20 71 Pac. at 288.
21 Lake v. Hood, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 32, 79 S. W. 323 (1904); 9 Tx. Jun., Charities
§ 8 (1948). See Carleton v. Roberts, 1 Posey Unrep. 587 (1880).
Lightfoot v. Poindexter, 199 S. W. 1152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) writ oj error refused; Gidley v. Lovenberg, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 203. 79 S. W. 831 (1904) writ of error
refused; Willis v. Alvey, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 96, 69 S. W. 1035 (1902) writ of error refused; 9 TEx. JuR. § 8 (1948).
23 Inglish v. Johnson, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 118, 95 S. W. 558 (1906).
24 For a discussion of appointment of trustees and a general collection of cases in
point see 2 BoGERT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 328 (1935); 3 Scorr ON TtusTS § 397
(1939). On the same subject see RESTATEMENT, TRUSrS § 101 (1939).
25 Pierce v. Weaver. 65 Tex. 44 (1885) ; Wells v. Richardson, 280 S. W. 608 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1926); 9 TE.x JUR. Charities § 8 (1948).
26 Boyd v. Frost Nat. Bank. 145 Tex. 206. 196 S. W. (2d) 497 (1946); Tunstall v.
Wormley. 54 Tex. 476 (1881). 9 TEx. Ju., Charities § 8 (1948).
27 Boyd v. Frost Nat. Bank. 145 Tex. 206. 196 S. W. (2d) 497 (1946); Powers v.
First Nat. Bank of Corsicana. 138 Tex. 604, 161 S. W. (2d) 273 (1942). For general
authorities on the subject see 10 Am. JuR.. Charities, § 83 (1937); 14 C. J. S. § 39.40
(1939); RF.STATmMNT, TtUSTS § 396 (1935); 3 Scorr ow TRUSTS § 396 (1939).
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whether the beneficiary is a proper charitable purpose.' The appointment of a compensated corporation as trustee of a charitable
trust does not render the trust invalid. 9
Primarily, the administration of a charitable trust is the duty

of the trustee. In contrast to a private trust, however, the beneficiaries of a charitable trust are usually too indefinite to invoke
the jurisdiction of a court of equity to enforce the trust if the

trustee refuses to act or abuses his control over the trust. It is
now well settled in Texas that the interest of society in charitable
trusts is sufficient to empower the Attorney General to bring suit
in equity to enforce such trusts."0 However, it would seem that
where a beneficiary has a special interest in the performance of a
charitable trust, such as an educational corporation created for
non-profit purposes, then such beneficiary can bring suit in its
31
own name.
The cases indicate a recurring argument on the part of contestants of charitable trusts that a court of equity does not have
power to enforce such trusts unless the Statute of Charitable Uses 2
is a part of Texas common law. This argument was declared to be
untenable as early as 1857, when the Supreme Court of Texas held
that courts of equity have inherent powers over charitable trusts,"
and subsequent cases"' have manifested a disposition to uphold
this view. The doctrine of inherent powers as announced by the
Boyd v. Frost Nat. Bank. 145 Tex. 206. 196 S. W. (2d) 497 (1946).
Ibid.; Powers v. First Nat. Bank of Corsicana, 138 Tex. 604. 161 S. W. (2d) 273
(1942); 2 BOCGERT. TRUSTS AND TRUSTE.ES § 365 (1935).
30 Boyd v. Frost Nat. Bank. 145 Tex. 206, 196 S. W. (2d) 497 (1946); Powers v.
First Nat. Bank of Corsicana. 138 Tex. 604. 161 S. W. (2d) 273 (1942); Allred v.
Beggs. 125 Tex. 584. 84 S. W. (2d) 223 (1935): Carroll v. City of Beaumont. 18 S. W.
(2d) 813 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) writ of error refused.
31 3 Scorr ON TRUSTS § 391 (1939) ; 2 Boca'T, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 412 (1935);
RESTATEMENT. TRUSTS § 391 (1935).
28
29

8243

Elix. C.4 (1601).

88 Hopkins v. Upshur. 20 Tex. 89 (1857).
34 Bell County v. Alexander, 22 Tex. 350 (1858); Paschal v. Acklin. 27 Tex. 173
(1863) ; Gidley v. Lovenberg, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 203, 79 S. W. 831 (1904) writ of error
refused; City of Houston v. Scottish Rite Benevolent Ass'n. 111 Tex. 191. 230 S. W.
978 (1921); Powers v. First Nat. Bank of Corsicana. 138 Tex. 604. 161 S. W. (2d)
273 (1942) ; Boyd v. Frost Nat. Bank. 145 Tex. 206. 196 S. W. (2d) 497 (1946).
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highest court of Texas is in accord with the holding of the United
States Supreme Court in Vidal v. Girard,35 where it was concluded
that chancery courts in England enforced charitable trusts prior
to 1601, the date of enactment of the Statute of Charitable Uses.
Occasionally the courts have been confronted with the problem
of enforcing a charitable trust when the purpose for which the trust
was created has failed. Is the cy pres doctrine" 6 applicable in Texas
under these conditions? The answer seems to hinge on whether
the testator or settlor had a general charitable intent at the time
the trust was created. If a general charitable intent can be found
and a specific charitable purpose mentioned in the same instrument has failed, then the doctrine will be applied. The opposite
result will be reached if no general charitable intent can be established. Thus in Inglish v. Johnson, 7 the court found a general
charitable intent and directed that benefits of a charitable trust be
used for a purpose that "would most nearly conform to the particular specified intention of the donor, to the end that a total
failure of the trust should not ensue.""8 On the other hand the
court refused to apply the cy pres doctrine where the trust had
been established to bring about prohibition, and this purpose was
accomplished by adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States before testarix's death. 9
In summary, the law is well settled that a charitable trust will
not be subjected to the Constitutional ban on perpetuities if it is
for a charitable purpose, and the courts have evidenced liberality
in finding such a purpose. However, the question seems to be open
as to the validity of a trust created for charity in general without
further directions as to distribution of benefits by the trustee.
According to Allred v. Beggs such a gift would be void. Powers
3 2 How. 127, 11 L. Ed. 205 (1844). This decision overruled Philadelphia Baptist
Ass'n v. Hart. 4 Wheat 1 (1819).
86 See note 2, supra, for definition.
:.42 Tex. Civ. App. 118, 95 S. W. 558 (1906) writ of error re/used.

s Id.at 561.
as Women's Christian Temperance Union of El Paso v. Cooley, 25 S. W. (2d) 171
(Tex. Civ. App. 1930) writ of error refused.

